Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto weSizwe Party remains the great unknown in South African politics. Questions persist over whether it is merely a personality cult, what it really stands for, and if the organisation, barely 10 months old, will become a lasting political player or fade into obscurity.
It is well documented that Zuma’s nine years as president caused immense damage to the economy and state institutions, that he was the king of state capture and institutionalised corruption, and that his presidency was a major setback in the fight against inequality, unemployment and poverty. Land reform nearly came to a complete halt during his administration.
Zuma himself was plagued by scandals from the start: the ongoing court case over the arms deal; a rape case; the misuse of state funds for the construction of Nkandla and his lies about it; his apparently corrupt relationship with the Gupta brothers and allegedly selling off of parts of the state for favours and gifts for his family and friends; his blatant disregard for the judiciary and the Zondo commission of inquiry into state capture. Zuma and his radical economic transformation (RET) faction divided the ANC more than any other leader in the party’s history.
And yet, 2.3-million voters cast their ballots for his new party on May 29. This is 14.6% of the vote, making uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) the third-largest party after the ANC and DA – 5 percentage points more popular than the established EFF. In KZN, 1.6-million voters supported the MKP in the provincial contest, more than double the ANC.
Four months later, it is even clearer than on election day that the party is built around the person of Zuma. He is the primary symbol, the cult figure at the heart of the party, personally making all important decisions and appointing and dismissing office bearers. He has no intention of holding a congress where leaders will be elected because, he says, it would expose the party to manipulation, bribery and infiltration.
This is where comparisons between Zuma and Donald Trump are relevant. By almost every measure, the US is better off under President Joe Biden than under Trump, as is the country’s international standing. Trump (78) has been repeatedly exposed as a pathological liar and narcissist, with various legal cases looming over him. Today, he boasts of his accomplishments as president and says he will make America great again. Half of the American voters believe him. As things stand, Trump has a 50% chance of being re-elected.
It’s too simplistic to understand this purely as a cult movement, and the same is likely true for Zuma and the MKP.
(There’s another similarity between Trump and Zuma: part of their motivation to regain power is to avoid prison.)
Shortly after the surprising election result, I compared Zuma to Jonas Savimbi, who also entirely dominated his party, Unita, in Angola. When Savimbi was shot dead in 2002, Unita rapidly declined.
But after reviewing the election results in Angola from 1992 to 2022, I must revise my comparison. In 1992, Savimbi garnered 40.2% of the vote in the presidential election, but his successor could only manage 18.6% in 2012. In the parliamentary election, Unita received 34% support in 1992, but only 10.4% in 2008 and 18.6% in 2012.
However, from around 2017, Unita began to grow again and, in 2022, Unita and its presidential candidate won 44% of the vote. It is now breathing down the incumbent MPLA’s neck more than ever before. It continues to enjoy overwhelming support among the Ovimbundu and Chokwe ethnic groups.
The lesson is that Unita had a reason to exist beyond the cult figure of Savimbi, and with good organisation and mobilisation, the party became stronger than ever.
MKP without JZ
The question now is whether the MKP can survive the death or withdrawal of Zuma due to poor health. Is there an MKP without JZ?
To answer this, we need to investigate who supports the party and why, and whether the party has the organisational potential to build and maintain structures.
Commentators are usually cautious not to emphasise ethnicity as a factor, but there is absolutely no doubt that Zulu ethnicity is central to the character of MK. By far, most of the support for the party in the election came from KZN and other places where there is a strong concentration of Zulu speakers. Zuma’s public speeches are almost exclusively in Zulu.
His daughter and MK MP Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla this week campaigned to rename Heritage Day to Shaka Day, a move widely supported by MK members.
The Zulu-speaking population, between 11-million and 14-million strong, forms the largest single ethnic group in South Africa with its approximately 60-million people.
Throughout his political career, Zuma has presented himself as a Zulu leader, in exile and thereafter. The IFP, which also has a strong Zulu identity, lost much support after Zuma became president in 2007. If not for Zuma, ANC support in KZN would have dwindled long ago.
For decades, Zuma has portrayed himself as the victim of various conspiracies, perpetuating the sentiment that an attack on him is an attack on Zulu identity – a weak Zuma is a weak Zulu nation. He has always made efforts to retain the loyalty of traditional Zulu leaders and chiefs.
But ethnicity cannot be the only explanation. If ANC governments since 1994 had governed more effectively and there was less corruption, mismanagement and poor governance, even Zulu speakers would not have so easily abandoned the party.
As with Trump, it bypasses many that Zuma’s administration was worse for the poor and working class than the administrations of Thabo Mbeki and Cyril Ramaphosa. He is the victim of the “Ramaphosa ANC”, and they can identify with that. They easily swallow his accusation that Ramaphosa is aligned with white monopoly capital and is un-ANC. They also like his social conservatism, homophobia and sexism. (He wants to send unmarried pregnant teenagers to Robben Island.)
Zuma’s strategy since launching the MKP in December – to paint the party as the real ANC rather than the Ramaphosa-ANC – has been very effective because most MKP voters who previously voted for the ANC did not feel they were betraying their old political identity. In fact, Zuma’s rhetoric against “white oppression” and returning land to the black majority aligns with how they remember the old ANC.
I have little doubt that an initial motive for the party’s founding was not about poor service delivery or the neglect of black South Africans, but an act of revenge because the patronage system from which they benefited was threatened. The taps of tenderpreneurship, jobs for cronies and state contracts were turned off. Several of the beneficiaries in the business world who were affected by this financially supported MK.
Coalition of the compromised
Few people truly believed before May 29 that the MKP would perform so well. Besides Zuma and his daughter, there were almost no well-known or experienced leaders or political operatives in the party, and the parliamentary list for the 58 seats was filled with unknown and inexperienced people.
Then, the MKP unexpectedly received nearly 15% of the vote. Soon, a whole cadre of the aggrieved, compromised and state capture-tainted came knocking at the door for a spot in parliament. People like ousted judge John Hlophe and those who fared poorly before the Zondo commission, such as Siyabonga Gama, Brian Molefe and Lucky Montana. Mzwanele Manyi, who also had a tough time before the Zondo commission, only resigned from the EFF two and a half months after the election and was recently appointed as MKP chief whip.
And then Zuma brutally kicked out a large chunk of the sitting MPs to make room for the Johnny-come-latelies.
It was a bonus for the MKP when Floyd Shivambu resigned as deputy leader of the EFF and was appointed as national organiser for the party – at least he has 10 years of party-political experience.
But Shivambu is not Zulu and was never in the Zuma or RET inner circle. In fact, he and Julius Malema hunted Zuma more than anyone else when he was still president. Zuma will not give him a free hand to do what he thinks needs to be done. Moreover, his talents as a political strategist are suspect as the EFF’s support has declined under his and Malema’s leadership.
One of the people who ensured that Zuma replaced Mbeki in 2007, Zwelinzima Vavi, then secretary-general of trade union federation Cosatu, said in a recent interview with Natasha Marrian of the Financial Mail that he is watching the MKP closely and sees a repeat of what happened back then.
“He draws this unconditional love and loyalty that is completely illogical. He has gone as far as to say to them that if he had been allowed to finish the nine months he had in office, he would have turned things around. He says he would have expropriated land without compensation, nationalised the Reserve Bank and all the banks, and nationalised the mining industry.
“And they believe him,” he laughs. “He is fooling these comrades.”
But for how long?
The MKP’s kryptonite will be if the government of national unity governs effectively and makes a tangible difference in the quality of life of black citizens.
If that doesn’t happen, the MKP, as chaotic as it is, could take over several local governments in 2026 and even beat the ANC in 2029.
If the MKP sticks to what it is proclaiming today, it will be catastrophic for our democracy and our economy.
* Max du Preez, the editor-in-chief of Vrye Weekblad and founding editor of the original magazine, is sharing these articles with Currency as part of a regular content-sharing agreement. www.vryeweekblad.com
Top image: Pixelated Umkhonto we Sizwe icon. Currency.