Behind Tshwane’s toxic politics

The removal of DA mayor Cilliers Brink has significantly more complex roots than many realise. And it could ultimately benefit Jacob Zuma’s MK Party, writes Vrye Weekblad’s Piet Croucamp.
4 mins read

Cilliers Brink held Tshwane’s mayoral position since March 2023 and was removed in late September through a motion of no confidence via an informal agreement between the ANC, EFF and ActionSA.

During a discussion at the Stellenbosch Word Festival this week, DA federal council chair Helen Zille placed the blame for Brink’s removal at the feet of Gauteng premier Panyaza Lesufi. But I wonder if the reality isn’t more complex than the “strongman” politics that Zille’s argument implies. 

There is a lot of white noise in Brink’s removal. At first glance, it seems as if the breakdown of the DA’s relationship with ActionSA leader Herman Mashaba is the reason for the collapse of the coalition agreement between ActionSA, the Freedom Front Plus, ACDP, COPE and the IFP in Tshwane. 

The DA has been leading coalitions in the city since 2016, and it is certainly valid to ask why financial management and service delivery are still so dire in the metro after nearly eight years. How long does a party, which prides itself on its ability to meticulously manage municipalities in terms of the auditor-general’s pedantic requirements, need to turn around a corrupt system? 

My colleague, professor Dirk Kotzé from Unisa, points out that auditor-general Tsakani Maluleke, in her most recent report, did mention that Tshwane has shown significant progress in addressing the endemic mismanagement and inadequate financial discipline in the city’s budget. The DA and Brink would argue that the systemic corruption in local governments’ value and supply chains has deep roots. The much-discussed inability of the South African legal system to police and prosecute makes it nearly impossible to expose the ANC’s omnipresent patronage system. And I think Brink has a point. 

It is this patronage system, served and managed by the ANC’s provincial executive committee (PEC), that led to Brink’s removal. Yet the PEC also serves as a counterweight to Lesufi’s monopoly on power.  

Even if he wanted to concede to his secretary-general Fikile Mbalula’s insistence that the configuration of the government of national unity be replicated at the provincial level, Lesufi simply does not have the political authority to protect Brink or the DA from the complicated will of the ANC’s PEC. 

That’s because the ANC in Gauteng is systematically plagued by the presence of factions and conflicting interests vying for control of resources and political influence. The PEC certainly does not have a homogeneous mindset with overwhelming loyalty to the common interests of the ANC and the country. Lesufi’s leadership is the ironic result of unbridled power politics. Arguably, his presence maintains these sharp dividing lines. 

Provincial power struggles 

In the PEC, there are cadres, opportunists, the tainted and individuals with divergent ideas about who should lead the metros, municipalities, the province and, ultimately, the country. Lesufi finds it extremely difficult to navigate these internal power struggles. 

As Brink has quite rightly pointed out, without a specific understanding of the identities and characters present in the PEC, you would be unaware of the power struggle between the water-truck cartels, the construction mafia, the destructive influence of tenderpreneurs in local and provincial supply chains, and the discouraging reality that whistleblowers face from assassins. 

Yet it is also the case that nothing happens in the metros and local governments without the will and knowledge of the ANC’s PEC – under Lesufi’s chairmanship. 

In a further complication, the ANC’s political will in Gauteng is limited because it no longer has a monopoly on power in any of Gauteng’s mega-municipalities or the province’s legislature. The party’s inability to win outright majorities in elections complicates the PEC’s insistence on a role in the provincial treasury’s capital spending.  

When the ANC’s national working committee recently engaged with Lesufi and the PEC about Brink in Tshwane and the configuration of coalition politics in Gauteng, Lesufi’s argument was that the fragmented power politics of the province make it impossible for him to force an internal compromise. This only reinforced opinions that have been simmering in Luthuli House and the Union Buildings since the national and provincial elections of May 2024, suggesting that the PECs of Gauteng and KZN should be placed under management. 

Gauteng is the most densely populated and economically important province in South Africa and experiences significant political pressure to address issues with infrastructure, housing, health and public services. Poor service delivery not only leads to public protests and dissatisfaction but is also reflected in election results. In the context of this fragmentation and the interests of ANC leaders in the province’s economic value and supply chains, Lesufi is under enormous pressure to improve service delivery before the 2026 local elections. 

That’s reflected in the decline in ANC support over the past decade. After the 2014 national and provincial elections, the party’s support stood at 53.59%. After the 2016 local government elections, it dropped to 45.85%, before recovering to 50.19% in the 2019 national and provincial elections. In this year’s elections, it collapsed to 34.7%. 

Sometimes, election results can be traced to a single dramatic event. The Life Esidimeni investigation in 2017/2018, led by retired deputy chief justice Dikgang Moseneke, was one such trigger.  

This tragedy occurred between October 2015 and June 2016, during David Makhura’s premiership. More than 1,400 psychiatric patients at the Life Esidimeni care facility were transferred by the Gauteng department of health to various unlicensed and poorly equipped NGOs. The move was intended to alleviate budget mismanagement pressure but led to severe neglect, inadequate care and the deaths of at least 144 patients. 

The tragedy became public in 2016 and led to widespread public outrage. Former health MEC Qedani Mahlangu’s role as a PEC member in the Gauteng ANC made her a key political figure in the Life Esidimeni scandal. The cruelty of a prominent ANC politician in the face of South Africa’s most vulnerable people manifested in both the 2021 and 2024 elections.  

Mahlangu resigned in shame on February 1 2017. Makhura was never really leadership material and on October 6 2022 he reluctantly made way for Lesufi, whose own political management has subsequently been hotly debated in both Luthuli House and the Union Buildings.  

However, Lesufi warns that an uncalculated intervention by the national working committee or Luthuli House could ignite a powder keg, making the province even more unstable and ultimately benefiting the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) in 2026. Gauteng is certainly one of the growth points targeted by MKP, and there are prominent ANC members in the province suspected of sympathising with Jacob Zuma and his party. 

Either way you slice it, Gauteng is in for a rough time. 

Image: Collage. Currency. 

Piet Croucamp

Piet Croucamp, contributing editor of Vrye Weekblad, is professor of political studies at North-West University.

Latest from Opinion

Don't Miss